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Abstract – In this paper we use a game-theoretical approach 
to model a global partnership in building global earth 
observation system. Our analysis of possible equilibrium 
solutions shows that only in the case of similar economies we 
will observe cooperation behavior (when all invest into global 
system) and otherwise we will observe free-riding. However 
uncertainty in environmental risks valuing can provide a 
strong incentive for free-riders to cooperate. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The emergence of a global partnership on earth observations will 
crucially drive the configuration of future observing systems and 
consequently shape how socio-economic benefits are generated. In 
this paper we use a game-theoretical approach to model 
cooperation on building global earth observation system. We 
consider societies whose economies are subject to shocks 
mimicking major natural disasters. Economies operate optimally 
and lead to the best possible expected value for the social welfares 
in the future. In order to increase its welfare even more society can 
make a decision to invest into a global system which lowers the 
risk of disasters. We start our investigation from a single-society 
case and show conditions under which benefits of such investment 
can be reaped. The propensity to invest increases with economic 
affluence and degree of vulnerability to natural disasters. We show 
that for poor and/or less vulnerable countries it is better to forbear 
from investment. In the situation of multiple societies a strategic 
gaming situation emerges motivated by the fact that every society 
will benefit from a global system regardless of whether they 
invested or not. Our analysis of possible equilibrium solutions 
shows that similar to the formation of trading blocks (e.g. EU, 
NAFTA) only in the case of similar societies we will observe 
cooperation behavior (when all invest) and otherwise we will 
observe free-riding. However uncertainty in environmental risks 
valuing can provide a strong incentive for free-riders to cooperate.  
 
2. MODEL 
 
We consider a stylized neoclassical model of the development of 
an economy affected by random natural hazards; the latter are 
treated as suggested in (Chladna et al, 2006). 
Let us consider an economy operating over an infinite sequence of 
time periods, K,1,0=i  In each period i the economy is 
characterized by the size of its capital stock,
iK , and the size of its 
production output, ii KY α= ; hereα is a given positive coefficient 
(we use the simplest one-factor Cobb–Douglas production func-
tion). In period 0 the initial size of the capital stock, 00 >K , is 
given. The economy is affected by natural hazards occurring 
randomly. In order to reduce the negative impact of natural 
hazards in periods 1,2,…, in period 0 part ),0[ 0Yz∈ of the initial 
production output 
00 KY α=  is invested in the development of 
prevention measures (building global earth observation systems 
allowing the economy to mitigate the future losses caused by 
natural hazards). The rest of the initial production output is 
divided between capital investment, 
0I , and consumption, 0C  
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In period 0 an extreme event (a natural catastrophe) can occur with 
probability
0q ; as a result the capital stock loses its fraction 
)1,0(∈d . Introducing a capital depreciation rate )1,0(∈δ , we 
find that in period 1 the size of the capital stock is given by 
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where 0ζ is a random variable taking value d−1 with probability 
0q  and value 1 with probability 01 q− . In each period 
K,2,1=i the capital stock iK  is divided between capital 
investment,
iI , and consumption, iC  
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here )1,0[∈is is the savings rate of capital. In period i an extreme 
event occurs with probability q, causing the loss of fraction d of 
the capital stock. Accordingly, 
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where
iζ is a random variable taking value d−1 with probability 
q and value 1 with probability q−1 . Probability q endogenously 
depends on the preventive measures introduced in period 0, 
namely, we suppose that q is negatively related to the size of 
investment, z, more specifically, we set 
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whereκ kappa is a given positive coefficient characterizing the 
efficiency of investment. 
Social planner chooses economy’s control parameters is , 
K,1,0=i , in order to maximize the economy’s utility, expected 
value of the social welfare (discounted consumption), 
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here ρ is a given positive discount rate. 
The optimal solution for the model can be found analytically using 
dynamic programming method. The following proposition gives 
us the optimal savings rate and welfare (see (Kryazhimskiy et al., 
2008) for details). 
 
Proposition 1. For every ),0[ 0Kz α∈ , the optimization problem 
has the unique solution 
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Thus we know now how to run optimally the economy to achieve 
the perfect (expected) welfare. Could we make it better somehow? 
Yes, we can! We can raise a problem of optimal investment z in 
prevention measures 
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Proposition 2. The problem (2) has the unique solution ∗z : 
if  
,
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then 0=∗z , 
if the inequality opposite to (3) holds then ∗z  is positive and given 
by 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧= ∗ −+
−++
≤−∗∗
,
,
2
1
2)0)(1()1log(001
otherwisez
ifzz
K
dqK δα
ρδρακρκ  
 
where  
 
,)1(2
)1log(01
)1(2
2/1))0)1(1)(1(4)1log(0(
2/1))1log(0(
1 ρρκκρρκ
κδαρρ
+
−
+−+
−+++−−−∗ = dqKdqdqz
.22
)1log(01
22
2/1))10(
24)1log(0(
2/1))1log(0(
2 κρκκρ
ακρ dqKdqdqz −+−+−−−∗ =  
 
Consider, in more detail, the cases where the optimal investment 
in the prevention measures, ∗z , is zero and positive, respectively. 
The right hand side of (3) determining the case 0=∗z  involves 
parameters characterizing the economy’s dynamics only, whereas 
its left hand side, )1log(00 dqK −κ , is clearly related to natural 
hazards. Indeed, the product 0Kκ characterizes the economy’s 
ability to cope with natural hazards in period 0 (recall that κ is the 
efficiency of investment in the prevention measures, and 0K is the 
size of the initial capital stock); and the product )1log(0 dq −  
acts as a measure of danger caused by natural hazards; it grows as 
0q  (the initial probability of natural hazards) and d (the fractional 
size of losses due to natural hazards) grow. Inequality (3) tells us, 
roughly, that either the economy has a low ability to cope with 
natural hazards, or the measure of danger, caused by natural 
hazards is not high enough. In this situation the economy refrains 
from investing in the prevention measures in period 0: 0=∗z . 
Conversely, the inequality opposite to (3) tells us, roughly, that 
either the economy has a high ability to cope with natural hazards, 
or the measure of danger, caused by natural hazards is quite high. 
In this situation the economy invests a positive resource in the 
prevention measures in period 0: 0>∗z . 
 
3. INVESTMENT GAME 
 
Now we consider the case of two independent economies both 
under the threat of natural disasters. Each of the economies can 
make an investment in common prevention measures aimed at 
mitigating the impact of natural hazards on both economies. We 
suppose that each economy is subject the same dynamics as in the 
previous section but with its own set of parameters. We only need 
to modify the rule (1) to introduce a joint effect of prevention 
measures; namely we assume that q, the probability of the 
occurrence of natural hazards after the implementation of the 
prevention measures, is negatively related to the economies’ 
investments, 1z and 2z , more specifically, we set 
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where 1κ , 2κ characterize the efficiency of investment of 
economies. As in the previous section each economy is 
maximizing its utility by choosing the value for savings rate at 
each period K,1,0=i To reflect the indirect (thru (4)) influence 
of the investment into prevention measures made by one economy 
to the welfare of other economy we will use the notations 
),( 211 zzW and ),(
21
2 zzW  instead of )(
1
1 zW  and )(
2
2 zW . 
Optimal values for savings rate and utility in each economy follow 
the Proposition 1 (with some obvious changes).  
Investment game appears as soon as we raise a problem of finding 
a pair of values ( 1z , 2z ) which maximizes the welfares of both 
economies 
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Our goal is to characterize the Nash equilibrium in such a game. 
To do this we solve each maximization problem independently 
and construct so called functions of best reply )( 21 zz ∗  and 
)( 12 zz ∗ . More specifically, e.g., )( 21 zz ∗  is the optimal 
investment of the first economy in the case where the second 
economy invested 2z . These functions can be described in an 
analytical way very similar to Proposition 2 but we will not show 
them here to avoid very big formulas (see (Kryazhimskiy et al., 
2008) for details). We only mention one important case (similar to 
(3)): if 
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then 0)( 21 =∗ zz . 
What is also important to note here is that functions )( 21 zz ∗  and 
)( 12 zz ∗  are turn to be almost (piecewise) linear decreasing 
functions of their arguments.  
 
Proposition 3. Investment game problem always has a unique 
Nash equilibrium solution ( 1∗z , 2∗z ) which is the solution of the 
following system of equations 
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All equilibrium solutions could be classified into three following 
cases:  1) Both economies refrain from investment into preventing 
measures; 2) Only one economy invests; 3) Both economies 
invest. Cases 1 and 2 we call non-cooperative behavior, Case 3 is 
cooperative. It is quite obvious that if an economy doesn’t invest 
in a single economy framework (see (3)) then it doesn’t invest in 
the game framework as well. However even for the economy with 
the initial propensity to invest this propensity vanishes at some 
critical level of the investment of the other economy (see (5)). 
Further analysis reveals that most frequently we get a non-
cooperative outcome in the investment game.  
 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 shows the example of “cooperation zone” on the plane of 
model parameters 10K and
2
0K (initial states of the economies) 
given that all other parameters are fixed and equal in both 
economies. In fact this numerical example represents a general 
feature of the game: economies should be quite similar to be 
cooperative in investments into preventive measures. 
 
4. ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY 
 
As we have just seen “poor” and “rich” economies are hardly to 
cooperate in the investment game. However, such a conclusion is 
valid only in the context of perfect knowledge about model’s 
parameters. And as long as we are talking about economical 
parameters (capital stock, depreciation rate, etc.) this can be true. 
But we unlikely know precise values for the probability of natural 
disasters (parameter 0q ) and their impact on capital stock 
(parameter d ). Uncertainty analysis of equilibrium solutions 
generated by system (6) shows that for the some of previously 
non-cooperative economies there will appear additional 
cooperative solutions. Figure 2 shows that 10% uncertainty in the 
probability 0q of occurring of natural disaster leads to the 
increasing of “cooperation zone” of Figure 1 more than twice. 
Grey area on the figure describes the economies where 
cooperation becomes an option. 
 
Figure 2. 
 
However to “compensate” these wider cooperation cases we lose 
the uniqueness of equilibrium solution in the game (cf. 
Proposition 3). And this is a serious loss because (without any 
special assumptions concerning uncertainty itself) we get an 
infinite set of possible cooperative equilibriums.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We used a game-theoretical approach to model cooperation of 
independent economies on building global system aimed on 
mitigation of future economical losses caused by natural disasters. 
Our analysis of global partnership shows that partnership is 
naturally emerge among similar economies but uncertainty in 
environmental risks valuing provides a strong incentive for 
cooperation for broader spectrum of economies. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Z. Chladna, E. Moltchanova, and M. Obersteiner, “Prevention of 
Surprise”, in: S. Albeverio, V. Jentsch, H. Kantz (Eds.), Extreme 
Events in Nature and Society, Springer, vol. 352, pp. 295–318, 
2006. 
A. Kryazhimskiy, M. Obersteiner, and A. Smirnov, “Infinite-
horizon dynamic programming and application to management”, 
Appl. Math. Comput., 205, pp. 609–620, (doi:10.1016/j.amc.2008. 
05.042), 2008. 
